Thus far, the discussion of power and strategy in the age of the spectacle has revealed three combinations: 1) lethal and coercive force deployed in a direct Clausewitzian manner, 2) lethal and coercive force deployed in an indirect manner in the tradition of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, and 3) non-coercive (or “soft”) power deployed in a direct Clausewitzian manner that takes the form of information campaigns and propaganda. This leaves only one possible combination left—that of deploying non-coercive “soft” power in an indirect manner. This intersection of power and strategy is difficult to define and conceptualize as it is a very diffuse deployment of power. However, it is also in the age of social networking and media saturation the most effective way of altering the behaviors of a targeted community. Like the deployment of coercive force in the Sun Tzu tradition, the object of such approaches is to deceive an adversary of one’s true intentions and bring about a desired behavioral change without overt deployments of force (or in the case of non-coercive power, information). This is especially important in age of mass cynicism when audiences are already keen to the tricks of advertisers and public relations specialists and take any overt message with a grain of salt. How can a state (or non-state actor) maneuver an adversary to a desired outcome without letting their propaganda and efforts at persuasion show?
A situation where subtle deployments of information and imagery can have the same effect as violent deployments of military requires understanding the context in which such an otherwise absurd situation could occur. Suffice to say, such a historical circumstance is not common in the broad sweep of history, yet this is the contemporary reality—an emerging worldwide consumer capitalist amusement park is part and parcel of the project of globalization and there does not seem to be any sign that this project is being abandoned. The often aforementioned Guy Debord—the leading critic on this emerging consumer playground—suggested the starting point was somewhere in the 1920s:
…the society of the spectacle has continued to advance. It moves quickly for in 1967 it had barely forty years behind it; though it had used them to the full.
In the subsequent decades, the account Debord gave of the spectacle has intensified to a point that what was in the 1960s a phenomenon confined largely to the western world became universalized after the end of Cold War rivalry and the beginning of the process of globalization.
So what are the “weapons” of this form of spectacular power? According to Matthew Fraser, they include four primary platforms: movies, television, pop music and fast food. For the late Ben Barber, it was all these elements plus theme parks and pulp literature. In both these books, the echoes of Creel’s emphasis on “the great war machinery“ of “…the printed word, the spoken word, the motion picture, the telegraph, the cable, the wireless, the poster, the sign-board.” Yet what is different here is the way these assets are deployed. Instead of a steady and intense stream of facts and information directed a mass audience that is the common feature of wartime propaganda, these life-altering images deploy in a more diffuse manner primarily during one’s leisure time. The “bullets” of these weapons aren’t not metal that maim, but images that entertain. They don’t inspire fear and dread, but stimulate fantasy and imagination. They are, to quote Howard Beale from the movie Network, “the most awesome goddamn force in the whole godless world” (though Beale was only talking about television specifically, it is easy to extrapolate this idea to all broadcast and digital media).
Embedded in these cultural products are a host of principles, values, codes of ethics and morality, biases, judgments, and any other kind of normative ideas. The audience is exposed to them at a time when their normal defenses are down and their critical capacities are not in use. They draw in the attention of millions of individuals with depictions of seductive lifestyles of pleasure and comfort and esteem and status while not explicitly asking for anything in return. They motivate individuals to act and behave in ways they might not otherwise have an incentive in the absence of such stimulation, often placing the pursuit of these comforts over the requirements of king and country. The research done to manufacture the programming dispensed through these implements of seduction seeks to uncover the psychological barriers and mental defenses of the audience to the messages conveyed and then construct precise language and imagery necessary to circumvent these emotional barriers. This is the ultimate application of Sun Tzu’s strategy of war as deception as the targets of these “weapons of mass distraction” are seeking out opportunities to surrender to their power. For an actor that truly masters the techniques of spectacular power, there is never a battle to be fought as the adversary has long ago capitulated.
It is here, perhaps, where another interpretation of the alleged Russian “hacks” of 2016 lie. Unable to challenge the United States in military capability deployed in the Clausewitzian manner, Russia has sought to deploy both coercive and non-coercive force in alternative manners. It has used a Sun Tzu military strategy in places like Ukraine, adopted a similar tact with cyberattacks in neighboring countries like Estonia, and developed a Creel approach to propaganda directed at its rivals in the form of its satellite channel RT. But in developing an army of bots to infiltrate social media sites like Twitter and Facebook, Russia is seeking to find ways to deploy new assets that have not been seen as part of the “war machinery.” These are the assets that entertain and entice and seduce by delivering pleasure, comfort and security to individuals at a time when they are at their most vulnerable—at home seeking social connection and validation on the internet. They develop messages that play on the raw ids of millions of people—their fear of others, their sadness at what they see as the shortcomings of their life, their depression at not living the fantastic (but false and fraudulent) world of the spectacle—and then use the intimate access they have gained to sow chaos in the targeted society. It is unclear if such actions constitute an act of war—the power is non-coercive and the strategy ensures a degree of plausible deniability. But there is a danger that if such actions continue to be effective, a state that is continually a victim of such spectacular power will turn to other forms of power and strategy to defend itself.
Guy Debord, Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle (London: Verso, 1998), 3.
 Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2003), 13.
 Ben Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine, 1996).
 George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper Brothers, 1920), 5.