This post will renew a thread of thought begun several months ago that contemplated the status of American power in the world. The key line of inquiry centered on the question of American Empire, and whether such a term was accurate or useful in the current assemblage of global politics. The discussion lent itself to four different answers based on how one responded to the questions of whether or not US power was a good thing or bad thing in the world and whether this power constituted an empire of some kind. The last post to address this question briefly explored a double affirmative response to these questions–that American power IS a good and necessary thing for world order and that American power IS an empire. Admittedly, there is not much scrutiny here in terms of whether those who argue for the existence of American Empire are actually describing an empire in the academic sense (something that some academics themselves have claimed is impossible to do)[1] or simply using the term to denote the overwhelming power of the United States—primarily its military power. But whatever the reason for using the term, there is clearly a cross-section of writers and thinkers who believe the US to be some kind of empire.

This post focuses on a similar perspective in terms of those who believe American power is a good thing and necessary for global stability. Yet those who fall into this box are either reluctant to use the term empire or eschew it altogether.

The main group one can identify holding the position of American power being good, but not an empire position is the neoconservatives. While many of what we might term as “hard neoconservatives” occupied the position where they believed American power was empire, these “soft neoconservatives are hostile to this position. Like Max Boot (discussed in a previous post), soft neoconservatives are unapologetic about the enormous righteousness and virtue they believe American power brings to the sphere of global politics, but they refrain from labeling this power imperial. The best examples of these “soft” neo-conservatives arguments come from the words of former officials in the George W. Bush administration who may indeed be more sympathetic to the view of more orthodox “hard” neo-conservatives, but must confront the burden of conveying their ideas in a more conciliatory fashion. Indeed, the credibility of American foreign policy initiatives that purportedly are designed to create and deepen democracy would be frightfully damaged should American overseas conduct come to be seen an imperialistic. Or, as Donald Rumsfeld declared in an interview with Al-Jazeera, “We (the United States) have never been a colonial power. We don’t take our force and go around the world and try to take other people’s resources, their oil….That’s not how democracies behave.” Fuller statements of this position are found in works by David Frum and Richard Perle, though even these seem to be little more than point-by-point defenses of American foreign policy since September 11^th. Unfortunately, the more one becomes familiar with the soft neo-conservative vantage point, the more one sees they suffer from the same deficiencies as regular neo-conservatives, namely the inability to maintain a critical perspective on their own ideas and an almost divine belief in the inevitability of their vision.

This is, in an odd way, the current position of Trump and his administration as well. Trump’s rhetoric is full of references to the idea of “America First” and related phrases, but for the most part the language is free from references to a formal “empire” or imperium. Indeed, part of the “America First” disposition is a distancing from some of the imperial hallmarks of the past—including invasions of foreign countries, taking a leading position in international institutions (especially in institutions like NATO) and challenging foreign rivals. Of these past practices of US foreign policy, Trump has been highly critical of the Iraq invasion, has threatened to pull out of NATO, and been friendly with states like North Korea and Russia. He has maintained more hostile positions with China and Iran, but even here, his rhetoric is more about, in his words, “getting a better deal” (on trade with China and a more aggressive nuclear deal with Iran) than a recognition of a perpetual struggle against intractable enemies. On the Iran, issue, Trump has even squelched military actions that likely would have gone forward in the previous administration of Obama or the hypothetical administration of Hilary Clinton.

Yet Trump still believes in the central role of American power in the world. His eschewing of the language of empire does not negate his policies that still see a world where American power is best way of maintaining world order. Trump’s has boosted spending on the military, increasing the amount allocated to the Pentagon by several hundred billion dollars compared to where the budget allocation sat the last year of the Obama presidency. Trump has also directed much at the spending on systems and platforms of an offensive nature.[2] Trump has launched cruise missiles against Syria (in a moment when his normally harsh establishment critics praised him)[3] and rattled the US sabre against Venezuela (perhaps even being persuaded to launch a slow-motion coup in the that state).[4]

The tensions within the current national security apparatus are thus not debates about fundamental values about the role of the United States in the world, but debates about where to tinker with this power. Should the focus be in the Middle East or China? Should the US boost its nuclear capacity or keep it where it is? Should institutions like NATO be a focal point of US power or should the US be more independent and autonomous? Yet despite the differences, the common ground remains the same: American power is the central facet of world order today and maintaining it is the key priority of US foreign policy. But no matter how powerful it, how intrusive it may or may not be, or how much is costs: it is not an empire.

     [1]  “Imperialism is no word for scholars.” W.K. Hancock quoted in Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic, 1973).

     [2]  https://theweek.com/articles/828753/trump-isnt-rolling-back-american-empire-hes-expanding

     [3]  https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/327779-cnn-host-donald-trump-became-president-last-night

     [4]  https://www.newsweek.com/maduro-trump-venezuela-guaido-1444914