American Empire Exists, But It Is Not A Force For Good in the World

Previous posts have sought to scratch the surface of thought about US foreign policy within the context of the now dormant question of American Empire. The first post on this topic briefly discussed those thinkers that believed American Empire was real and that is was a force for goodness in the world as well as hope for improving the lot of other states and societies in other parts of the world—a sort of mission civilsatrice updated for the American Century. The second post agreed that American power was a good thing, but that the use of this power as well as the global structure from which it came did not constitute an “empire” in any classical or academic sense. To be sure, American hegemony exists, but empire practiced in the manner of British or French imperialisms of the past were in no way applicable.[1]

This post samples perspectives who agree with the first set of ideas arguing for that American Empire is a reality in some form, but makes a sharp disagreement with the idea that American power represents a good thing in the world or is necessary to maintain any form of global order—imperial or otherwise. Indeed, the samples here generally see the projection of American power (especially military power) in a very negative light. These perspectives include what one might understand as the continuation of the Maxists-Leninist critique of imperialism, the “paleoconservative” critics of US foreign-policy interventionism, and a category one might label as “progressive internationalists” and “liberal anti-interventionists.” Together, they constitute one of the more diverse blocs of thought on the ontology and morality of American Empire.

The Marxist-Leninist perspective represented here flows from Vladimir Lenin’s critique of capitalism and the imperatives it places on the state for imperial expansion made famous in his pamphlet Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.[2] In a nutshell, Lenin’s argument asserts that as capitalism progresses to its more advanced stages where competition between various commercial and banking concerns becomes ever more intense while profits become ever less abundant, will seek out foreign opportunities to escape saturated domestic markets and once more reap substantial profits. But these foreign opportunities are often fraught with danger—both from local native populations who resist foreign intrusion as well as from competing concerns from other countries seeking their own overseas windfalls. The state, which is famously described by Marx as being an “executive committee”[3] for bourgeoise, uses its military force to protect these commercial endeavors from the variety of these threats before more permanent arrangements are made (which can range from establishing settler colonies, formally annexing foreign territory, or working with local intermediaries to establish a framework of business-friendly rule and governance). Lenin’s argument is, among other things, an attempt to explain the outbreak of World War I and why this war, as least for Lenin at the time, was straw that would break the camel’s back in terms of bringing down the bourgeoise regimes of Europe. Unfortunately for Lenin, while revolution did arrive in Russia, it never fully materialized in the rest of Europe, even after the war ended.

For latter day critics of American foreign policy, this failed prediction on the part of Lenin, did undermine the larger critique he made in Imperialism. For much of the Cold War, writers like Harry Magdoff sustained a voice of radical critique of US foreign policy, which he dubbed “imperialism without colonies.” This form of imperialism, Magdoff argued, deployed other forms of governance and institutions beside direct political rule to economically exploit the natural resources and consumer markets of countries outside of Europe and North America, including conditional development assistance, unequal trading arrangements, and military bases that together constitute a “new imperialism.”[4]  In the wake of the attacks of September 11th, Robert Bellamy Foster borrowed from this strand of thought to characterize much of the transformations in US foreign policy taking place in the heady days after the attack as a need to reconsolidate and reorganize American interests overseas to protect capital investment (especially in Middle East oil infrastructure) and legitimize new waves of military interventions under the banner of humanitarianism.[5]

Taking a radically different path, but no less coarse in the their criticism, are the so-called paleo-conservatives. Represented most auspiciously by Patrick Buchanan, paleo-conservatives come at the idea of American Empire from a much less philosophical view. Instead, the problem of American foreign policy is one of elite policy errors brought about by a rejection or ignorance of the founding principles of the United States as expressed in key early documents like George Washington’s Farewell Address.[6] Because of this detachment from this original founding myths, the United States has, to mutate the title from one of Buchanan’s most famous book, transformed from a republic to an empire.[7] Instead of spending gargantuan amounts of money overseas to protect assets belonging to economic and cultural elites, US foreign policy should reduce or eliminate its global footprint and focus on developing the national economy alongside a national spirit and identity (with rhetoric that often features racial and other prejudicial overtones). Certain staunch libertarian activists also fit into this category, including Republican gadfly Ron Paul, who wrote with regards to foreign policy that, “setting a good example is a far better way to spread ideals than through force of arms.”[8] Ron’s son Rand continues to uphold this tradition in the Senate.

The final category of US foreign policy critics who see the United States as an Empire to the detriment of the itself and the rest of the world can be labeled as anti-interventionist. The main argumentative thrust of this perspective is that while the US should be engaged with the rests of the world diplomatically and economically, the propensity for US foreign policy elites and popular ignorance (or support in the form of patriotic bravado) to use its enormous military power as tool for realizing its interests creates what Andrew Bacevich calls “an imperial tense” that creates as many problems for global stability than it solves.[9] Perhaps the most visible adherent of this viewpoint is Noam Chomsky, who has published a series of books that often feature harsh critiques of US foreign policy and its role in creating or exacerbating global conflicts. For example, in Hegemony or Survival, Chomsky places events like the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in a larger historical context going back to the early twentieth century and the frequent interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean to argue that the terrorist attacks of 9-11 did not change US foreign policy in any genuine or substantive way. Foreign intervention and empire-building were always in the DNA of US foreign policy and the “war on terror” that began after 9-11 is merely a rebranding of the same set of ideas and actions.[10]

This category also includes a collection of former military officers who, in the spirit of former Marine Smedley Butler, have written scathing critiques of US foreign policy and often use the words “empire” and “imperialism” in their arguments (even if they don’t offer any comprehensive definition of these terms).[11] During the late 90s and early 00s, one of the most prolific writers in this vein was Chalmers Johnson, who most famously invoked the term “blowback” to describe the consequences of an overreliance on US military force as a tool that could solve any and all foreign policy woes. While engagement with the world diplomatically remained crucial, Johnson argued, “the United States should bring most of its overseas land-based forces home and reorient its foreign policy to stress leadership through example and diplomacy.”[12] The aforementioned Andrew Bacevitch has also written eloquently on this topic. He writings range from a pre-9-11 critique of a mistaken bi-partisan foreign policy consensus on the liberal use of American military power to “the spectacle” and celebration of militarism in American society to a critical history of US military intervention in the Middle East.[13]

While no category discussed here can be said to have the ear of major foreign policy decision-makers or constitute an approach to foreign policy in general taken seriously among the halls of power in the United States, they have served a useful role in keeping the idea of American Empire alive in academic and cultural circles. And given President Donald Trump’s apparent aversion for foreign policy adventurism, especially as it pertains to his condemnations of the invasion of Iraq, it is perhaps possible a few of the ideas expressed here, especially by the likes of Johnson and Bacevich, made it to his ears or those of his advisors.

     [1] See Nye, Soft Power, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

     [2] Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Online version available at:

     [3] Karl Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party available at:

     [4] Harry Magdoff, Imperialism Without Colonies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003).

     [5] John Bellamy Foster, Naked Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006).

     [6] For George Washington’s Farewell Address, see:

     [7] Patrick Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire (Washington DC., Regnery, 1999).

     [8] Ron Paul, A Foreign Policy of Freedom: Peace, Commerce, and Honest Friendship (Foundation for Rational Economics & Education, 2007).

     [9] Andrew Bacevitch, The Imperial Tense, (Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2003).

     [10] Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival (New York: Holt, 2004).

     [11] Smedley Butler was one of the most decorated Marines in US history but who nevertheless came to recognize his frequent deployments were in service to things other than vital US national interests. In War Is a Racket, he famously worte  “I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers.”

     [12] Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Holt, 2000). See also The Sorrows of Empire (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).

     [13] See Andrew Bacevich, American Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), America’s War for the Middle East (New York: Random House, 2016).


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